









Closing ranks between prevention and management of 
























 Closing ranks between prevention and management of systemic crises 




This version: 28 August 2018 
 
Abstract 
On the occasion of related proposals by the European Commission and the 
Eurogroup, this paper proposes to entrust the ESM with the hosting of the 
ESRB in the medium term. The novel proposal aims at strengthening the 
macro-prudential expertise of the ESM and at enhancing the independence of 
the ESRB. Following a brief summary of related proposals, the main 
rationales and the key elements of the proposal are presented in detail. 
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1. Introduction 
As reaction to the global financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis, two 
new institutions were established in Europe. While the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) 
was created as macro-prudential watchdog to oversee risk in the financial system and to 
contribute to the prevention of financial stability risks, the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) was set-up - as successor of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) - to 
provide stability support to Member States as prompt measure of crisis management in order to 
safeguard financial stability. Despite the naturally high interrelatedness of prevention and 
management of financial stability risks, both institutions have been established independently 
and, by now, there have been no indications for close cooperation or exchange between them. 
This is also reflected in the way the two reform proposals by the European Commission for 
both institutions are currently discussed – separately and in isolation from one another. 
This paper argues, firstly, that both reform proposals should be discussed together in light of 
the envisaged new role of the ESM as common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund and the 
critique as regards the current hosting-model of the ESRB. Secondly, it introduces the novel 
proposal to link both institutions by entrusting the ESM with the hosting of the ESRB in the 
medium term. This would close ranks between prevention, mitigation and management of 
systemic crises and would ensure that financial stability is safeguarded in a more 
comprehensively manner. 
The present paper aims at adding a novel element to the ongoing debate on a reform of the 
financial and economic governance of the European Union and, in particular, the euro area. It 
sheds light on the links between the two institutions that have so far not attracted much 
attention. The proposal corresponds to a related proposal as regards the surveillance of fiscal 
and macroeconomic policies. Embedded in a broader reform package, a group of 14 economists 
from Germany and France have proposed to transfer the role of the fiscal and macroeconomic 
watchdog to the ESM or another independent body to address current governance issues 
(Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2018). 
The following section summarises the recent reform proposals on the ESM by the European 
Commission and the Eurogroup and on the ESRB by the European Commission. The next 
section discusses the rationale for a strengthening of the macro-prudential expertise of the ESM 
and for an improvement of the hosting structure of the ESRB. Section 4 presents the detailed 
reform proposal and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Recent reform proposals by the European Commission and the Eurogroup 
2.1. Reform proposals on the ESM 
The ESM was established in October 2012 at the height of the sovereign debt crisis (see profile 
in box 1). The Member States and the European Commission agree on the important role it has 
played since its inception. The ESM is safeguarding the stability of the euro area by providing 
financial support to countries that are experiencing severe financing distress as their regular 
access to market financing is impaired or is at risk of being impaired (European Commission 
2017c, Eurogroup 2018).  
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Going forward, the European Commission and the Eurogroup agree that the ESM should be 
enhanced and reinforced: 
 In December 2017, the European Commission has tabled a proposal for a European 
Monetary Fund (EMF) that would succeed the ESM and would be established as a legal 
entity under EU law
1
 (European Commission 2017c). In addition, the proposal of the 
European Commission foresees that the EMF would be able to provide a common 
backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) by providing credit lines or setting 
guarantees in support of the Single Resolution Board (SRB)
2
. 
 In June 2018, the Eurogroup (2018) achieved a consensus that a reinforced ESM will 
provide the common backstop to the SRF in the form of a revolving credit line. It was 
agreed that this would be part of a broader reform in order to reinforce the ESM while 
conditionality will remain an underlying principle of all ESM instruments. In the future, 
the ESM should take a stronger role in the design and monitoring of programmes. 
Following IMF practice, some Member States have suggested that the ESM should also 
be enabled to assess the overall economic situation in the Member States and, when 
appropriate, may also facilitate the dialogue between Member States and their creditors. 
The Eurogroup, however, rejected the proposal by the European Commission for an 
immediate incorporation into EU law and suggested a decision on the matter at a later 
stage, as long as key features of the ESM governance are preserved. 
Both the proposal by the European Commission and the agreement of the Eurogroup foresee 
that the ESM should provide a common backstop to the SRF. The common backstop is 
considered as a last resort measure and would be called on only in a crisis situation in which the 
resolution of a failing credit institution is necessary to preserve financial stability of the euro 
area and the means of the SRF would not be sufficient to resolve this systemic crisis. While this 
new task of the ESM relates very much to the prevention of systemic crises, neither the 
European Commission nor the Eurogroup make a reference to macro-prudential policy as an 
element of crisis prevention or suggest how the expertise and the competence of the ESM as 
regards macro-prudential policy could be strengthened. 
 
Box 1: Current set-up of the ESM 
 
Mandate and competences of the ESM 
The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was set up in October 2012 as a successor to the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) which was established in June 2010. The 
purpose of the ESM, as defined in Article 3 of the ESM Treaty, is to mobilise funding and 
provide stability support to ESM Members experiencing, or threatened by, severe financing 
problems. This support can only be provided under strict conditionality and if indispensable 
to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and of its Member States. Such 
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 According to the European Commission, the institutional structure of the ESM would be preserved (see European 
Commission 2017c). 
2
 The proposal comprises further changes as regards decision making, the management of financial assistance 
programmes and the development of new financial instruments. However, these features will not be discussed here 
as this discussion paper focuses on another potential element to enhance the ESM/EMF. 
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conditionality may range from a macro-economic adjustment programme to continuous 
respect of pre-established eligibility conditions (Article 12 (1)). The ESM treaty foresees five 
instruments for the provision of stability support: precautionary financial assistance (Article 
14), financial assistance for the recapitalisation of financial institutions of an ESM Member 
(Article 15), ESM loans (Article 16) and primary or secondary market support facility 
(Article  17, 18). In addition, the ESM direct recapitalisation instrument for euro area 
financial institutions has been established as an additional instrument by the Board of 
Governors in 2014. The six instruments clearly reflect the crisis management function of the 
ESM. The ESM can raise funds by issuing financial instruments or by financial or other 
arrangements with ESM Members, financial institutions or other third parties. 
 
Organisation of the ESM 
The ESM Treaty establishes the following organisational structure: A Board of Governors 
(Finance Ministers of ESM Member States) as highest decision-making body, a Board of 
Directors, as well as a Managing Director. The Managing Director serves as chief of the 
staff, is the legal representative and conducts the current business of the ESM. 
The Board of Governors is chaired by the President of the Eurogroup, Mário Centeno, and 
the Board of Directors is chaired by the ESM Managing Director, Klaus Regling.
3
 The 
Managing Director is appointed by the Board of Governors and, whilst in office, may neither 
be a Governor or a Director.  
 
Activities of the ESM 
Out of the six instruments available to the ESM, to date, only ESM loans and loans for 
indirect bank recapitalization were used. Loans were provided by the ESM and the EFSF as 
its successor to Ireland and Portugal (EFSF), Greece (EFSF and ESM), and Cyprus (ESM). 
The loans were provided conditional upon the implementation of macroeconomic reform 
programmes and were negotiated on behalf of the ESM by the European Commission in 
liaison with the ECB and, where possible, the IMF. An ESM loan for indirect bank 
recapitalisation was, to date, only provided to Spain.
4
 
The daily work of the ESM staff focuses on programme related tasks and financial 
operations. The former includes programme negotiations and discussions with other creditors 
as well as the monitoring of the economies of programme countries. Following the 
completion of a programme, an Early Warning System is implemented to continuously assess 
whether the beneficiary Member State is able to repay its loans.
5
 The latter tasks comprise, 
for instance, managing of the paid-in capital of EUR 80.4 billion, raising money to finance 





Staff and administrative costs of the ESM
7
 
According to its annual report, the ESM employed 174 persons on 31 December 2017. The 
ESM incurred total staff costs of EUR 31.2 million and further costs of EUR 1.2 million for 
employees seconded from other International Financial Institutions, as well as interim and 
temporary staff hired from external agencies in 2017. Other administrative expenses 
amounted to EUR 27.8 million (excl. costs for seconded, interim and temporary staff). 
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 ESM, 2018, p. 60-63. 
4
 ESM, 2018, p. 55. 
5
 ESM, 2018, p. 14. 
6
 ESM, 2018, p. 37. 
7
 ESM, 2018, p. 106. 
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2.2. Reform proposal on the ESRB 
The ESRB was established in December 2010 following the recommendation of the de 
Larosière group (see box 2). It contributes to the prevention or mitigation of risks to the 
stability of the financial system in the European Union by overseeing respective systemic risks 
and issuing warnings or recommendations for remedial action in response to risks identified. 
As required by the ESRB Regulation, the European Commission carried out a review of the 
ESRB and concluded that it is generally well-functioning (European Commission, 2017b). 
Hence, its proposal published in September 2017 foresees only a couple of limited changes 
(European Commission, 2017a): Firstly, it is proposed that the ECB President becomes the 
Chair of the ESRB General Board on a permanent basis. Secondly, the creation of the Banking 
Union is taken into account by proposing that the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the 
Single Resolution Board should also become voting members of the General Board and that the 
ECB should be included as a possible addressee of ESRB warnings and recommendations 
related to its respective supervisory tasks. With regard to the appointment of the Head of 
Secretariat by the ECB, it is, thirdly, proposed to introduce a consultation procedure in which 
the General Board would examine the candidates proposed by the ECB. At the same time, it is 
foreseen that the Chair may delegate tasks related to the external representation tasks of the 
ESRB to the Head of Secretariat. The proposal is currently under discussion in the European 
Parliament and in the Council. 
 
Box 2: Current set-up of the ESRB 
 
Mandate and competences of the ESRB 
The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) was set-up in December 2010 with the mandate 
to oversee risk in the financial system and to contribute to the prevention or mitigation of 
systemic risks to financial stability in the European Union. The founding Regulation 
(1092/2010) stipulates, in particular, the following tasks: analysis all the relevant and 
necessary information, identification and prioritization of systemic risks, and close 
cooperation with other supervisory authorities. While the ESRB cannot enact legally binding 
instruments, it can issue (i) warnings where systemic risks are deemed to be significant and 
(ii) recommendations for remedial action in response to risks identified. Both instruments are 
subject to a "comply or explain" mechanism and, therefore, are non-binding which reflects 
the more preventive role of the ESRB as a macro-prudential watchdog. The design of the 
ESRB followed a respective recommendation by the de Larosière group (European 
Commission, 2009a). 
 
Organisation of the ESRB
8
 
The founding regulation foresees the following organisational structure for the ESRB: 
General Board as highest decision making body, a Steering Committee, an Advisory 
Scientific Committee (ASC), an Advisory Technical Committee (ATC) and a Secretariat.  
The ESRB General Board and the Steering Committee are currently chaired by the President 
of the ECB, Mario Draghi. The ASC is currently chaired by Professor Javier Suarez, the 
ATC by Philip R. Lane, Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland. Francesco Mazzaferro 
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 ESRB, 2018, p. 55. 
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serves as Head of Secretariat and was appointed by the ECB (in consultation with the 




Activities of the ESRB 
According to its Annual Report 2017, the ESRB hosted 33 active working groups and 
organised 126 internal meetings and 357 teleconferences in 2017/2018 to perform its 
assigned tasks.
10
 In addition, the ESRB held a number of conferences and workshops to 
facilitate a dialogue between policy makers and researchers
11
 and launched a series of annual 
conference in 2016. Between 1 April 2017 and 31 March 2018, the ESRB has published 3 
recommendations, 5 opinions, 1 compliance report, 3 occasional papers, 8 ESRB reports, 32 




Staff and administrative costs related to the ESRB
13
 
In its current role as hosting institution, the ECB supports the ESRB by providing the ESRB 
Secretariat in accordance with the European Regulations 1092/2010 and 1096/2010. This 
includes the provision of analytical, statistical, logistical and administrative support. 
According to the ESRB annual report, the support was provided by 60.6 ECB (full-time 
equivalent) staff members in 2017; thereof 28.8 persons within the Secretariat and 31.8 
persons involved in other forms of support. Other member institutions of the ESRB provided 
approximately 64.7 (full-time equivalent) persons for analytical support for the ESRB 
working groups. 
The ECB incurred direct costs of EUR 9.3 million and indirect costs of an unknown amount 
for other shared support services (e.g. human resources, IT, general administration). 
 
 
3. Rationale for coupling the ESRB with the ESM 
3.1. Strengthening the macro-prudential expertise of the ESM 
After the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2007, the governments of most European 
countries found themselves forced to stabilise the financial system by providing guarantees to 
banks in financial distress or even bailing them out. These actions have significantly affected 
public finances. The government interventions coupled with the budgetary effects of the 
following recession have led to a severe deterioration of fiscal positions and a substantial 
increase in debt-to-GDP ratios in most European countries. 
Empirical research suggests that the negative effect of banking crises, comparable to the crisis 
following 2007, amounts to an average medium-term increase of more than 35 percentage 
points in the government gross debt‐to‐GDP ratio (Furceri and Zdzienicka 2012).14 Particularly, 
vulnerable banking systems characterised by weak bank profitability, low asset quality and a 
weak capital base pose a threat to public finances (Tagkalakis 2014). Besides the direct effects, 
the more indirect effects of financial crises in form of deeper and longer recessions, notably 
following house and equity price busts, are well documented (e.g. Claessens et al., 2012). 
Especially, the bust of mortgage booms is followed by considerably lower growth rates (Jordà 
et al., 2016). 
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 Article 3 (2) of Regulation 1096/2010. 
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 ESRB, 2018, p. 55. 
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 ESRB, 2018, p. 56. 
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 ESRB, 2018, Annex, pp. 58-63. 
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 ESRB, 2018, p. 55. 
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 Furceri and Zdzienicka (2012) define medium term as eight years after the crisis. 
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The global financial crisis turned into a European sovereign debt crisis when government 
financing costs peaked in some countries of the euro area and their market access was impaired 
or at stake. In order to safeguard financial stability, the European Financial Stability Facility 
was created in 2010 and succeeded by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in 2012 at the 
height of the sovereign debt crisis. Their mandate was restricted to the (ex-post) provision of 
stability support under strict conditionality and neither a preventive (ex-ante) monitoring of 
risks to financial stability nor a macro-prudential watchdog role were foreseen for the ESM (see 
box 1 for an overview of mandate, competences and activities). However, there is a case for a 
more preventive role of the ESM as this might avert the materialization of risks to the stability 
of the financial system ex ante. Therefore, the financial stability expertise of the ESM should 
be strengthened in order to enable the ESM to identify and analyze potential risks for financial 
stability that could deteriorate public finances as the ultimate consequence.
15
 A strengthened 
ESM could then also take the role of a macro-prudential watchdog. Moreover, it could be 
justified to involve the strengthened ESM in macro-prudential policy making or at least in the 
coordination of macro-prudential policy at the European level. 
Regarding the analysis of potential risks for financial stability, the IMF and its Financial Sector 
Assessment Program (FSAP) might serve as a blueprint: The objective of the FSAP 
assessments is to gauge the stability and soundness of the financial sector and to assess its 
potential contribution to growth and development. It is mandatory for those jurisdictions with 
systemically important financial sectors to undergo assessments under the FSAP every five 
years (since 2013: 29 jurisdictions). The FSAP findings are also used as input into the broader 
surveillance exercises of the IMF (“Article IV consultations”).16 
Strengthening the macro-prudential expertise and role of the ESM becomes even more relevant 
if the ESM provides a common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) in the future (see 
section 2.1). Recall that a situation in which the SRF has to call upon the common backstop 
would have been preceded by a massive threat to the stability of the financial system caused by 
one or more systemically relevant banks that are failing or likely to fail. Moreover, the common 
backstop would need to step in only when the losses and the cost of resolution are so high that 
they cannot be covered by the write-down of shares, the bail-in of debt instruments (write-
down and/or conversion) and the use of the industry financed means of the resolution fund. 
Such a situation would clearly constitute a financial crisis with severe risks to financial 
stability. It is the first and foremost objective of macro-prudential oversight to identify and 
analyze such risks well in advance, to prepare and, then, to take appropriate preventive 
measures. If the provision of the common backstop is assigned to the ESM, it should be 
enabled to build-up the necessary capabilities and be equipped with the required resources. 
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 Tagkalakis (2014, p. 176), for instance, concludes his analysis by suggesting that “macro-prudential supervisors 
should be in close coordination with fiscal policy makers to monitor the links between financial market and fiscal 
policy developments, i.e., financial stability and fiscal policy risks should be jointly analyzed.” 
16
 See the IMF Factsheet on the Financial Sector Assessment Program, IMF 2018. 
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3.2. Strengthening the independence of the ESRB by adjusting its hosting model 
The ongoing discussions in the Council of the European Union and in the European Parliament 
on the governance of the ESRB provide an appropriate occasion to reassess the current hosting 
model of the ESRB (see box 2 for a brief profile). The two co-legislators are currently 
discussing the proposal that entails selected changes to the ESRB governance and was 
published by the European Commission in September 2017 (see section 2.2). 
The proposal of the European Commission does not entail major amendments to the ESRB 
governance or its hosting model; instead it foresees that the President of the ECB should chair 
the ESRB General Board on a permanent basis.
17
 The proposal and, in particular, the provision 
as regards the ESRB Chair gave rise to much discussion. The Dutch Government, for instance, 
was explicitly called on by its parliament to speak out against the proposal that the ECB 
Presidents chairs the ESRB General Board permanently as this would prevent a serious 
recognition of systemic risks related to the ECB’s monetary policy stance.18 In the European 
Parliament’s public hearing on the ESRB Review, also de Larosière (2018) expressed his 
doubts whether the ESRB - being completely linked to the ECB - has both the authority and 
independence to alert about all relevant risks for financial stability. Instead of further 
integrating the ESRB into the ECB, de Larosière proposed to reinforce the independence of the 
ESRB vis-á-vis the ECB. 
Table 1: Likely Instances of Conflicts between Monetary and Macro-Prudential Policies  
 Inflation above 
target 




Financial exuberance (boom) Complementary Independent Conflicting 
No imbalance Independent Independent Independent 
Financial deflation (bust) Conflicting Independent Complementary 
Source: Beau et al. (2014). 
The fundamental issue here is how monetary policy and macro-prudential policy interact and 
whether conflicts between both policy fields may arise. Hellwig (2014), for instances, 
highlights that the monetary policy objective and the financial stability objective do not 
necessarily coincide and conflicts will arise when both policies are assigned to one institution. 
He cautions that macro-prudential powers might be used for monetary policy purposes if 
monetary policy goals and macro-economic considerations dominate. In the same vein, Beau et 
al. (2014) categorise possible scenarios for the relationship between the two policy fields. They 
identify times of excessive increases of asset prices (“financial exuberance”) with inflation 
rates below target and times of asset price busts (“financial deflation”) with inflation rates 
above target as scenarios in which conflicts between monetary policy and macro-prudential are 
likely to occur (see table 1). The occurrence of such policy conflicts might outweigh the 
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 Article 5 of the current ESRB Regulation (1092/2010) stipulates that the ECB President should be Chair of the 
ESRB General Board for the first five years after the establishment of the ESRB in 2010 and that the Chair for the 
subsequent terms should be designated in accordance with the modalities determined on the basis of a review due 
by 17 December 2013. As no new designation modalities have been put in place, the ECB President has continued 
to chair the ESRB General Board after December 2015 (European Commission, 2017b). 
18
 The Dutch Government was called on by the House of Representatives of the Netherlands to “speak out clearly 
against the proposal [by the European Commission] that the President of the ECB should become the permanent 
President of the ESRB” given that otherwise “systemic risks caused by the ECB are not recognised enough [by the 
ESRB]” (Motion no. 1295, adopted on 13 February 2018, own translation by the author). Out of 13 party groups, 
11 voted in favor of the motion (House of Representatives of the Netherlands, 2018). 
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benefits in terms of reduced coordination problems when same institution is entrusted with both 
policies. This concern is of particular relevance given the financial stability implications of the 
current low interest rate environment and the current monetary policy stance of the ECB. With 
regard to the hosting of the ESRB by the ECB, this provokes the question whether the ESRB is 
prone to a conflict of interest between the monetary policy objective of its hosting institution 
and its own financial stability objective.
19
 Such a conflict of interest would endanger the 
ESRBs role as macro-prudential watchdog as it could, for instance, impede an open and frank 
discussion of the financial-stability implications of the current low interest rate environment. 
Against this background, it is at least questionable whether the ESRB is independent enough to 
issue a warning or recommendation addressing macro-prudential risks that might result from 
the low interest rate environment when needed.
20
 Strengthening the ESRB’s autonomy and 
independence vis-à-vis the ECB could solve this issue. 
Similarly, a conflict of interest might arise with regard to the ECB’s supervisory tasks within 
the Banking Union. The recent proposal by the European Commission (see section 2.2) takes 
these concerns into account and includes the ECB as a possible addressee of ESRB warnings 
and recommendations related to those tasks conferred to the ECB by the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism Regulation (Regulation 1024/2013). While this would legally authorise the ESRB 
to issue such a warning or recommendation it does not solve the conflict of interest issue: If a 
warning or recommendation to the ECB in its role as bank supervisor is needed, the ESRB 
Chair, the Head of Secretariat and his team, all being ECB staff, will steer or prepare the 
drafting. The Advisory Scientific Committee of the ESRB (2013) has highlighted that the 
central role of the ECB within the ESRB and the fact that the ECB President is the Chair of the 
ESRB could be highly detrimental to the ESRB's ability to issue warnings and 
recommendations related to the ECB's supervisory tasks.
21
 Hence, it is an open question 
whether a warning or recommendation addressing the ECB in its role as supervisor will be 
issued when needed. This will largely depend on the independence of the ESRB and, therefore, 
disentangling the ESRB from the ECB would contribute to limiting any doubts in this regard. 
The discussion about the hosting model of the ESRB is not new. In the run-up to establishment 
of the ESRB, the European Commission had assessed alternative hosting models including the 
option of a hosting by the European Commission itself (European Commission 2009c), but it 
decided to propose the present ECB-hosted model (European Commission 2009a, b) and 
provided the already existing expertise for macro-prudential issues at the ECB as main 
argument in favor (European Commission 2009c).
22
 However, times have changed since then. 
Macro-prudential oversight and macro-prudential policy are no longer unchartered waters with 
Central Banks as exclusive knowledge carriers and many experiences have been gained. There 
is, in particular, a growing experience with the application of macro-prudential instruments by 
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 The issue was also raised in the public consultation held by the European Commission (2017b) in 2016. 
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 This was the major concern underlying the above mentioned motion of the Dutch Parliament (House of 
Representatives of the Netherlands, 2018). Also de Larosière (2018) questioned the authority and independence of 
the ESRB to alert about respective risks given the current hosting model. 
21
 The issue was raised by stakeholders in the consultation held by the European Commission (2017b) in 2016. 
22
 Goodhart (2012) argues similarly in his throughout discussion of alternative design options for macro-prudential 
institutions at the national level when he argues that the newly created Macro-Prudential Authority of the UK 
should be part of the Bank of England. 
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designated authorities outside the Central Bank sphere.
23
 Alternative models for the hosting of 
the ESRB should now be at least conceivable, if not tantamount. This would also address 
concerns that the close link between the ECB and the ESRB may negatively affect the public 
perception of the ESRB as an autonomous body (European Commission 2017b). 
To sum up, having the ECB as hosting institution of the ESRB entails significant synergies, but 
this hosting model is prone to a potential twofold conflict of interest that might arise between 
the financial stability objective of the ESRB and the monetary policy objective and the 
supervisory role of the ECB as hosting institution. As the potential twofold conflict of interest 
is highly detrimental for the role of the ESRB as macro-prudential watchdog and its public 
perception as autonomous body, alternative hosting models should be considered to strengthen 
its independence in the medium term. As Central Banks continue to be the most experienced 
institutions as regards macro-prudential policy, it will be important to ensure their continued 
involvement. However, the growing experience with macro-prudential policy of authorities 
outside their sphere highlights that alternative institutional arrangements could be envisaged as 
well. 
 
4. Proposal to couple the ESRB with the ESM 
4.1. Details of the proposal 
The section above highlights the need to strengthen the macro-prudential expertise and the 
surveillance competence of the ESM and the need to enhance the independence of the ESRB in 
order to avoid potential conflicts of interests in the current hosting model. It is therefore 
proposed to refine the hosting model of the ESRB by transferring to an ESM-hosted model in 
the medium term and to enhance the macro-prudential expertise of the ESM. This will also 
bring the ESM closer to an IMF-type model which combines the surveillance function with the 
conditional provision of financial resources to countries in financial distress. The proposal 
builds on eight key elements which are laid out in the following. 
1. Adapt the hosting model by transferring the ESRB to the ESM 
The current hosting model has raised critique and concerns as regards the independence of 
the ESRB in delivering on its mandate as macro-prudential watchdog. The main concern are 
potential conflicts of interest between the monetary policy objective and the supervisory role 
of the ECB and the macro-prudential policy objective of the ESRB. A transformation of the 
ESRB into a European agency similar to the three ESAs might not be appropriate to solve 
the identified issue. Instead, the hosting model of the ESRB should be adapted by entrusting 
the ESM with its hosting. This adaption of the hosting model would also reflect that the 
interests of both institutions will be even more aligned after the introduction of the common 
backstop than today. Both institutions will, then, have the objective to avert financial 
stability risks that could pose a threat to the stability of the financial system and, thereby, 
could trigger a call on the common backstop to the SRF or endanger the stability of public 
finances of an EU Member State. 
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 The ESRB Macroprudential Measures Database entails of all notified macro-prudential instruments applied by 
Member States. The Database is accessible on the website of the ESRB. In addition, ESRB (2017) provides an 
overview of the authorities designated for the application of macro-prudential instruments. 
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2. Maintain the current board structure of the ESRB 
The current board structure of the ESRB with members of the National Central Banks, the 
National Competent Authorities as well as members from the European Central Bank and 
the European authorities is one of the main strengths of the ESRB and should therefore be 
kept. This will ensure a continued involvement of the current ESRB members and will 
enable them to provide their expertise and relevant data to the General Board of the ESRB 
and the respective committees and working groups also in the future. 
3. Ensure continued membership of Central Banks in order to benefit from their 
expertise 
This proposal aims at avoiding the potential conflict of interest related to the current hosting 
model of the ESRB. It does not aim at excluding the European Central Bank or the National 
Central Banks from the ESRB General Board or the respective committees. To the contrary, 
the membership of the Central Banks and their participation in the General Board and the 
respective committees is considered as the main virtue of the ESRB. It also accounts for the 
task to contribute to the conduct of policies related to the stability of the financial system 
which is assigned to the European System of Central Banks in the Treaties.
24
 Hence, the 
European Central Bank and the National Central Banks should continue to be members of 
the ESRB despite an amended hosting model. Thereby, they could continue to provide their 
expertise, data and analytical capacities to the ESRB and the respective committees. 
4. Transfer of the ESRB Secretariat to the ESM 
Assigning the hosting of the ESRB to the ESM will require a transfer of the ESRB 
Secretariat to the ESM. This will affect roughly 30 staff members of the Secretariat and 
potentially further 30 staff members providing other forms of support (see box 2). If a direct 
transfer is not possible, the ESM could also set up a new secretariat for the ESRB. Details 
will have to be elaborated at a later stage. 
5. Build-up of a dedicated macro-prudential unit at the ESM 
Beside the hosting of the Secretariat of the ESRB, the ESM should also enhance its own 
financial stability expertise and, therefore, set up a dedicated macro-prudential unit. This 
will enable the ESM to prepare own independent risk assessments and to participate and 
contribute to ESRB committees and working groups. This would also contribute to the 
surveillance competence of the ESM (similar to the IMF). 
6. Provide the ESM with one (voting) member in the General Board 
The Managing Director of the ESM should become a voting member of the General Board 
of the ESRB in order to ensure its participation and to enable a continuous contribution of its 
expertise to the ESRB. Accordingly, the ESM should participate in the respective 
committees and working groups like the Steering Committee and the Advisory Technical 
Committee. If the Chair of the General Board of the ESRB does not become a full-time 
position, the Managing Director should assume the position of the Chair. 
                                                          
24
 In accordance with Article 127(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 3(3) of the 
Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank stipulates that they shall 
contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the stability of the 
financial system. 
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7. Consider the appointment of an independent full-time Chair of the General Board 
of the ESRB 
All members of the General Board including the ESM Managing Director as its Chair are ex 
officio members on the basis of their main full-time position.
25
 As they can at best devote 
only a limited amount of time to the work of the ESRB, it could also be considered to 
upgrade the position of the Chair of the General Board to a full-time position and to appoint 
an independent expert instead of assigning this position to the ESM Managing Director. This 
could also contribute to an increased visibility of the ESRB itself. 
8. Reassess the distribution of voting rights among the members in the General Board 
The suggested reform of the ESRB could be used to reconsider the current dichotomy 
among the members of the General Board. At the time when the ESRB was set-up it might 
have been reasonable to have mainly Central Bank Governors as voting members and 
confine the Heads of Competent Authorities to a role of non-voting members given the fact 
that Central Banks were almost exclusive knowledge carriers as regards macro-prudential 
policy. In light of the experiences gained by many National Competent Authorities in the 




Taking into account the envisaged new role of the ESM as common backstop, the overarching 
goal of this proposal is to enable the ESRB and the ESM to deliver even better on their 
mandates to safeguard financial stability in future. Therefore, the proposal and its eight key 
elements strive to achieve the two following objectives: i) to strengthen the macro-prudential 
expertise and surveillance competence of the ESM and ii) to tackle the critique as regards the 
limited independence of the ESRB that could hamper its role as macro-prudential watchdog. 
The former objective will be achieved by setting up a dedicated macro-prudential policy unit at 
the ESM. The latter objective will be attained by disentangling the ESRB from the ECB and 
entrusting the ESM with its hosting in the medium term. This would more or less eliminate the 
potential conflict of interest between the ESRBs financial stability objective and the ECBs 
monetary policy objective or banking supervision tasks. However, it will be crucial to ensure a 
continued participation of the European Central Bank and the National Central Banks in the 
ESRB in order to benefit from their expertise. The proposal of an ESM-hosted model for the 
ESRB would also create synergies both for ESRB and ESM, given that macro-prudential 
oversight and the design of stabilization programs requires (to some extent) similar skill 
profiles, as has been demonstrated by the IMF. 
4.2. Consideration of potential conflicts of interest, institutional design and legal issues 
The proposal aims at enhancing the macro-prudential expertise of the ESM and at addressing 
the issues raised concerning the limited independence of the ESRB. Nevertheless, it is worth to 
reconsider that a major critique of the current hosting model was the potential conflict of 
interest between the ESRB and its hosting institution (see section 3.2). Obviously, this problem 
might arise in any case in which the ESRB is hosted by another institution - including a hosting 
by the ESM. There are, however, good reasons that the potential for conflicts of interest 
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 The Chair and the two Vice-Chairs of the Advisory Scientific Committee are an exception as they have no full-
time position at the ESRB Advisory Scientific Committee, but are also voting members of the General Board. 
26
 See ESRB (2017) for an overview of the designated authorities. 
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between ESRB and ESM would be much more limited. First, the objectives of the ESRB and 
the ESM are more or less aligned: Both aim at averting risks which could endanger the stability 
of the financial system and could lead to a call on the common backstop to the SRF or to a 
massive deterioration of public finances of a Member State. Second, while ESRB and ESM 
might also have different views on the effects of monetary policy, none of them is responsible 
for setting the interest rate level.
27
 Thus, both institutions should be able to express their views 
on the implications of a particular policy stance while fully respecting the independence of the 
ECB. Third, as the ESM as potential host of the ESRB is not involved in the micro-prudential 
supervision of financial markets intermediaries and market participants, the ESRB would be 
more able to openly express its concerns and issue warnings or recommendations if it deems 
supervisory practices as insufficient. Hence, the potential for conflicts of interest between 
ESRB and ESM appears to be relatively limited. Moreover, remaining concerns could be 
accommodated by upgrading the position of the Chair of the General Board to a full-time 
position and appointing an independent expert as Chair as suggested above. 
Key element of this proposal is the transfer of the ESRB to the ESM. While the ESRB is an 
institution of all Member States and enshrined in EU law, the ESM is an institution of the 
Member States of the euro area and based on the intergovernmental ESM treaty. Here it is 
important to distinguish between the question of institutional design and the question of legal 
implementation. As regards the institutional design, the proposal would not deviate much from 
the current set-up given that both the ESM and the ECB are institutions for the euro area, i.e. 
the ESRB as institution for all EU Member States is already today hosted by an institution of 
the euro area. 
The purpose of this paper is to present the proposal and its key elements together with the 
(economic) rationale behind it. Therefore, the important question of legal implementation is not 
discussed here. In this regard, it might be of particular relevance how the ESM as - currently - 
intergovernmental institution can host the ESRB as institution established under EU law. But in 
view of the SRF which is established under a mixed system of EU law and an 
intergovernmental agreement it is not implausible that an appropriate legal solution can be 
found even if the ESM remains an intergovernmental institution in the future. This question 
will have to be looked at in the future if the proposal is considered further. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Recently, reform proposals have been presented for the ESM and the ESRB. With regard to the 
ESM, both the European Commission and the Eurogroup have proposed to entrust it with the 
provision of a common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund. Selected changes were 
proposed for the ESRB by the European Commission. This paper tries to shed light on the links 
                                                          
27
 In case of a continued environment of low interest rates, the ESRB might focus on implications for the financial 
sector (e.g. buoyant risk taking, excessive increases of asset prices, deteriorating profitability of banks) whereas 
the ESM might appreciate the reduced financing costs for governments and in particular for governments of those 
Member States that are currently in a program or are likely to apply for a program in the future. However, strong 
ties remain between ESRB and ECB even in case of an ESM-hosted ESRB as the Governors of all National 
Central Banks of the Eurozone are both members of the Governing Council of the ECB and the General Board of 
the ESRB. 
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between both institutions and proposes to strengthen the macro-prudential expertise of the ESM 
and to entrust it with the hosting of the ESRB in the medium term. This will address the 
concerns raised in relation to the currently limited independence of the ESRB. 
The present proposal would bring the ESM closer to an IMF-type model by combining the 
surveillance function with the role as provider of financial resources (under conditionality) to 
countries in financial distress. The proposal builds on eight key reform elements: 1) the ESM 
should become the hosting institution of the ESRB; 2) the current board structure of the ESRB 
should be maintained; 3) the continued membership and active contribution of the European 
Central Bank and the National Central Banks has to be ensured; 4) the ESRB Secretariat should 
be transferred to the ESM; 5) at the same time the ESM should set-up a dedicated financial 
stability unit to strengthen its own macro-prudential expertise and surveillance competence; 6) 
the Managing Director of the ESM should become a (voting) member and should serve as 
Chair of the General Board of the ESRB; 7) alternatively, one could consider upgrading the 
position of the Chair of the ESRB General Board to a full-time position and appointing an 
independent expert and last but not least 8) the current dichotomy among members of the 
General Board as regards voting rights could be reexamined. 
There are two rationales for the novel proposal outlined above: first, already the current 
mandate of the ESM suggests to strengthen its capabilities for identifying, monitoring and 
addressing risks to financial stability given the deteriorating effect of financial crises on public 
finances. This will become even more important with its extended role as common backstop to 
the Single Resolution Fund. Second, the ability of the ESRB to objectively identify and 
preventively address all financial stability risks has been questioned publicly given its limited 
independence due to the current hosting model. The main concern here is that the ESRB might 
be rendered ineffective as macro-prudential watchdog because of a potential conflict of interest 
caused by the threefold role of the ECB as monetary policy maker, as part of the SSM and as 
host of the ESRB with its financial stability mandate. Strengthening the macro-prudential 
expertise of the ESM and entrusting it with the hosting of the ESRB in the medium term would 
address the above mentioned issues. 
One might question whether replacing one host by another host really solves the conflict of 
interest issue. And, indeed, the danger of a conflict of interest will be present in any hosting 
model. But the potential for a conflict of interest between the ESRB and the ESM would be 
much more limited as compared to the current model. The interests of the ESRB and the ESM 
are more aligned and the ESM is neither involved in monetary policy making nor in micro-
prudential supervision. Also the difference in the membership of the ESM and the ESRB 
should not be an issue: It is already today the case that the ESRB, which is an institution for all 
Member States of the EU, is hosted by the ECB, which is an institution for the euro area only. 
As the purpose of this paper is to add a new element to the ongoing debate on the reform of 
Europe’s financial and economic governance, priority was given to the presentation of the 
general concept and its (economic) rationale. Important questions of legal implementation will 
have to be assessed if the proposal is considered further.  
The proposal outlined above would constitute a fundamental change to the architecture of the 
ESRB, but minor reforms might not be sufficient to ensure that financial stability risks are 
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